Ends, ways and means for Türkiye after the 2026 oil shock: electric vehicles, nuclear power and rare earths, March–September 2026
ABSTRACT
The restriction of Hormuz transit from early March 2026 revived the expectation that an oil shock accelerates electrification. This strategy piece argues that, for Türkiye, electrification reduces exposure to daily oil flows only if it is sequenced behind non-imported generation and if its mineral inputs are treated as a new supply risk. Market data from the IEA and BloombergNEF for the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Germany show that the crisis moved electrification through institutions and subsidy cycles rather than through fuel prices, and that China’s control of rare earth processing relocates vulnerability to the expansion phase. Four steps follow for Ankara, together with the principal risk: a Chinese decision after 10 November 2026 coinciding with a slip in Akkuyu’s first-power target.
1. Where the advantage of electrification sits
Electrification is defined here as replacing the direct combustion of oil products in transport and heating with electricity generated from sources less dependent on imported fuels. Cherp and Jewell (2014) define energy security as low vulnerability of vital energy systems. The definition implies that the security value of electrification depends on which new inputs the system comes to rely on, and not on the reduction of one vulnerability alone. Overland (2019) disputes the assumption that critical mineral dependence will reproduce oil dependence. The 2026 evidence supports his objection for one phase only. Minerals enter equipment once; an installed fleet of vehicles, turbines and reactors does not need a daily flow through a strait. The advantage of electrification therefore sits in the operating phase. In the expansion phase, new capacity depends on rare earth supply, and that supply is concentrated.
The concentration is measurable. China holds 69.2% of global rare earth mining (270,000 of 390,000 tonnes) and up to 90% of processing capacity; its 12-month suspension of export restrictions expires on 10 November 2026. Bloomberg Intelligence projects a 36% global NdPr deficit in 2030 although non-Chinese NdPr output is expected to rise 4.4-fold between 2024 and 2030 (Gonzalez, 2026). In May–June 2026 the G7 set a target of reducing single-supplier dependence in rare earths and permanent magnets below 60% by 2030 and eventually to 50%, and agreed to expand stockpiling and the IEA’s role; China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian defended the controls as consistent with international practice (China Global South Project, 2026). The G7 target itself tolerates a single-supplier share above 50% until 2030.
The 2026 sales data show that fuel prices did not set the pace. In the second quarter global car sales fell while electric vehicle sales rose 4%; the IEA expects electric vehicles to reach 29% of 2026 sales, against 24% in the first half, and total car sales fell 5% globally in the first half (Lo, 2026). Part of the share gain is a denominator effect. In an illustrative market of 100 cars with 20 electric vehicles, a 5% fall in total sales concentrated entirely in combustion vehicles raises the electric share from 20% to 21.1% (20/95) with no additional electric sale. In the United States, second-quarter electric sales rose 20% on the first quarter yet stayed about 25% below the same period of 2025, which the source attributes to purchases brought forward before federal tax credits ended in 2025. In China sales fell 16%, and the source lists reduced state subsidies for cheap cars among the causes of the fall in total sales (Lo, 2026). Subsidy decisions, not fuel prices, set the direction in the two largest markets.
Nuclear decisions followed existing institutions. Japan, which imported more than 90% of its crude through Hormuz, announced on 26 August 2026 a plan to rebuild up to five reactors by the 2040s and up to 14 by the 2050s, and requested ¥1.9838 trillion for energy and green-transformation spending in fiscal 2027 (Seo, 2026). South Korea raised nuclear utilisation to up to 80% in March 2026 (Ramage, 2026). Germany’s chancellor called the nuclear exit a “serious strategic mistake”, yet the government treated it as irreversible and planned 12 GW of mainly gas-fired flexible capacity not expected before 2031 (Bielamowicz, 2026). Japan’s horizon extends to the 2040s: new nuclear capacity does not buffer a crisis already under way.
2. Türkiye’s position
Türkiye’s electricity prices remain tied to imported gas. With effect from 4 April 2026 EMRA raised household electricity tariffs by 25% and the gas tariff for power generation by about 19.42% (Forbes Türkiye, 2026). Electrifying transport while generation stays gas-linked moves the import exposure from the fuel pump to the power bill. Energy Minister Bayraktar stated that first electricity from Akkuyu’s first unit is targeted by the end of 2026 and that 20,000 MW of nuclear capacity is planned by 2050 (NTV, 2026); as of September 2026 first power had not been verified. The $2 billion intergovernmental energy agreement signed in Riyadh in February 2026 includes 2,000 MW of solar projects (CNBC-e, 2026). Türkiye hosts COP31 in Antalya in November 2026 (Tekin et al., 2026). The sources used here contain no verified Turkish data on electric vehicle sales or rare earth processing, so the steps below set conditions rather than quantities.
3. Step one: Electrify behind non-imported generation
The end is lower exposure to oil and gas flows; the way is sequencing. Demand-side electrification should be paced to the commissioning of Akkuyu and of solar capacity, so that each additional unit of electric demand is matched by generation that does not require imported gas. The 2,000 MW of solar in the February agreement counts towards this step only if sited in Türkiye; the source does not state its location. The indicator is the date of verified first power at Akkuyu and, for the solar projects, their move into financing and tendering.
4. Step two: Design demand support without subsidy cliffs
The United States and China show that an abrupt end to purchase incentives can outweigh a fuel price shock. Turkish support for electric vehicles, if introduced or extended, should therefore taper on a published schedule rather than end on a single date. The trade-off is fiscal: a tapered scheme costs more in its final years than an abrupt cut. The indicator is quarterly sales measured in units, not shares.
5. Step three: Price mineral exposure into expansion plans
Because the vulnerability sits in the expansion phase, procurement for grids, wind turbines and vehicles should treat magnet and rare earth inputs as a supply risk with a date attached. The G7 combination of stockpiling and a single-supplier ceiling provides a template that Türkiye can mirror without joining a bloc. The indicator is the share of planned 2027 equipment procurement contracted before the 10 November 2026 decision becomes known.
6. Step four: Measure substitution in barrels
BloombergNEF estimates that electric vehicles displaced 2.3 mb/d of oil in 2025 and expects 5.25 mb/d by 2030; the estimate dates from March 2026 and excludes 2026 sales (Hilotin, 2026). Turkish targets should be stated in the same unit, oil displaced, so that a denominator effect in a falling car market is not reported as progress.
7. The principal risk
The principal risk is a coincidence of two delays. If China reimposes restrictions after 10 November 2026 and Akkuyu’s first-power target slips into 2027, Türkiye would face higher equipment costs for new capacity while still lacking new non-imported generation. Electrification would then raise gas-linked power demand without cutting import exposure.
8. Outlook: Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the World
Globally, two dates set the conditions. If China extends the suspension on 10 November 2026, electrification investment can proceed at its current pace; if it reimposes restrictions, magnet and equipment costs rise and 2027 capacity additions are delayed. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2026, due in November 2026 with several scenarios (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2026), will show whether institutional forecasts separate the denominator effect from genuine substitution.
For Türkiye, the end-2026 Akkuyu target is the first test of Step one. A slip to 2027 would confirm, as Japan’s 2040s horizon does, that new nuclear capacity cannot act as a short-term buffer. Hosting COP31 in November will make the tension between gas- and coal-based crisis measures and climate pledges visible for Ankara.
For Saudi Arabia, electrification is a long-term demand risk: BloombergNEF’s projected 5.25 mb/d of displacement by 2030 lowers the ceiling for a post-Hormuz recovery of export volumes. Renewable energy is also a cooperation item in Riyadh’s relationship with Ankara through the 2,000 MW solar agreement. The sources contain no verified current data on Saudi domestic renewable targets, so no projection is made for the Kingdom’s own transition.
9. Conclusion
The 2026 oil shock accelerated electrification in global share data more than in market data. Part of the share gain came from falling total sales, Chinese sales fell 16%, and US sales stayed below 2025 levels. Japan and South Korea used existing nuclear institutions, while Germany kept its pre-crisis path. Electrification lowers vulnerability to daily oil flows and moves the expansion of new capacity under China’s rare earth export decisions. For Türkiye the strategy follows from that split: tie electric demand to Akkuyu and solar commissioning, avoid subsidy cliffs, price mineral risk into procurement before 10 November, and measure progress in barrels displaced.
SOURCES
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Furkan Mahmut Tameroglu