EU storage series by date and provider, TTF prices by series, and the Commission’s assessments, March–September 2026
ABSTRACT
This brief compiles the EU gas storage figures reported between August and September 2026, keeping each measurement tied to its date and provider, and sets them against the European Commission’s statements, separately identified TTF price series and Asian LNG import data. It distinguishes measured storage levels from forecasts and official assessments. The record shows storage roughly 12–13 percentage points below the previous year across three measurements, Germany further behind, TTF at its highest since late 2022 according to one report, and Japan, China and South Korea importing 10 million tonnes less LNG. The Commission’s “no immediate concern” holds for physical continuity of supply; that continuity rests on a relaxed fill target and on prices high enough to outbid Asian buyers.
1. Scope and terms
On 20 August 2026 the Commission stated that EU storage was about 62% full and that there was no immediate concern for security of supply (ANSA, 2026). Two weeks earlier storage stood at 57%, the lowest for the time of year since 2011 (Paraskova, 2026). The brief covers the EU gas market from March to September 2026, with emphasis on August–September data.
Two concepts frame the compilation. Winzer (2012) defines energy security narrowly around the continuity of supply relative to demand; on the physical-flow reading used here, a system is secure while gas keeps flowing. Cherp and Jewell (2014) define energy security as low vulnerability of vital energy systems, combining exposure to risk with resilience. Chiappini, Jégourel and Raymond (2019) measure integration between US, European and Asian gas prices; where Europe and Asia bid for the same flexible LNG cargoes, one region’s volume security is matched by another region’s price or volume loss. “Volume security” here means that gas is physically obtainable; “price cost” means the market price paid to obtain it.
2. Storage series by date and provider
Storage figures come from different providers on different dates and are listed with their source.
| Date (2026) | EU fill | One year earlier | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 August | 57% | about 70% | Paraskova (2026) |
| 17 August | 61.4% | about 74% | XTB (2026) |
| 20 August | about 62% | — | ANSA (2026) |
| 28 August | 63% | 75.7% | Rystad Energy (2026) |
| Early September | 65% | — | Sommer (2026) |
The series rises consistently, but the year-on-year gap stays at about 12–13 points across the three measurements with a comparison (13.0, 12.6 and 12.7 points; author’s calculation). Injection ran close to the previous year’s pace without closing the gap. Germany is further behind: 50.1% on 17 August against about 67% a year earlier, a gap of about 17 points (XTB, 2026). On 10 September Carbon Pulse reported German storage at a 15-year low and on course to miss the EU target (Johnston, 2026).
Axpo states that storage entered September at a fifteen-year low; its start-of-winter fill of 70–73% is a forecast, not a measurement (Sommer, 2026). No verified end-September percentage exists in the sources: on 24 September the Commission said only that storage was below the historical average (Magenta, 2026).
3. The Commission’s assessment and the relaxed target
On 23 March 2026 the Commission asked member states to begin filling early and recalled that the EU Gas Storage Regulation allows the fill target to be lowered, its deadline extended and the injection season started early (European Commission, 2026). On 20 August the Commission said it did not aim to fill the 80% target completely; spokesperson Eva Hrncirova described filling as “slightly slower” than in previous years (ANSA, 2026). At the Gas Coordination Group meeting on 24 September the Commission said supply was stable and no emergency measures were needed (Magenta, 2026).
These statements are accurate under Winzer’s continuity definition, since gas flow was not interrupted. Once the storage target used as the resilience benchmark is relaxed during the crisis, compliance with it no longer measures performance. The obligation regime built in 2022 operated in 2026 as an adjustable reference, not as a binding requirement.
4. Prices, kept by series
The price record must be read series by series. The September TTF futures contract rose to about €66/MWh on 20 August, its highest since March, after a gain of more than 20% in two weeks (XTB, 2026). Axpo puts the August average of the TTF spot price at €61.50/MWh and reports power prices up at least 20% in Germany and France and reaching €180/MWh in Italy (Sommer, 2026). Within a single series, OilPriceAPI’s Dutch TTF reference moved from €47.83/MWh on 1 June to €80.77/MWh on 11 September, a rise of about 69% (80.77 ÷ 47.83 ≈ 1.69; OilPriceAPI, 2026). Carbon Pulse reported on 10 September that TTF had reached its highest level since late 2022, without a figure (Johnston, 2026). These numbers come from futures, spot-average and reference series and are not directly comparable with one another.
5. Where the volume came from
Rystad Energy (2026) reports that Europe drew in additional LNG while LNG imports into Japan, China and South Korea fell by a combined 10 million tonnes. The price integration measured by Chiappini et al. (2019) supplies the mechanism: when European prices rose to a level competitive with Asia, flexible cargoes turned to Europe and Asian buyers cut purchases. Europe’s volume security coincided with demand reduction in Asia.
Power-sector demand added to the pressure. According to Axpo, extreme summer heat reduced nuclear and hydro output and drought lowered river levels (Sommer, 2026), so gas served as back-up generation during the injection season. Massimo Di Odoardo of Wood Mackenzie said that low European stocks, strong Asian demand and limited new LNG supply made high prices almost certain this winter and through 2027, with the market moving into backwardation (Paraskova, 2026); this is an analyst forecast. In Cherp and Jewell’s (2014) terms, the post-2022 arrangement reduced Europe’s exposure to a single pipeline supplier and increased its exposure to the global LNG price.
6. Risk register
1. Winter drawdown risk. If Axpo’s 70–73% start-of-winter fill materialises, more than a quarter of storage capacity (27–30%) will be empty as heating demand begins (Sommer, 2026).
2. German shortfall risk. Germany started from about 17 points below the previous year in mid-August and, per Carbon Pulse, is on course to miss the EU target (Johnston, 2026).
3. Interregional price competition risk. Continued restriction of Gulf LNG keeps Europe bidding against Asia for flexible cargoes; Wood Mackenzie’s forecast extends high prices into 2027 (Paraskova, 2026).
4. Benchmark credibility risk. A fill target relaxed during a crisis weakens its value as a signal; the absence of an end-September figure leaves the 8 October findings as the next official reading (Magenta, 2026).
5. Assumption-lag risk. ECB staff projections, with a 19 August cut-off, assume gas prices of €51.0/MWh for 2026 and €43.3/MWh for 2027 (European Central Bank, 2026), set before the September rise.
7. Outlook: Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the World
For Türkiye, which is outside the EU storage regulation, the exposure runs through the same price channel. Türkiye imported 58.4 bcm of gas in 2025, of which Iran supplied 7.7 bcm (13.2%) and Russia 36.27%; the 25-year Iran contract was due to expire at the end of July 2026, with a reported five-year automatic renewal clause unless a party objected (Rudaw, 2026). The post-July status of that contract is not verified in the sources used here. If Europe–Asia competition for LNG continues through winter, any Turkish spot LNG purchases will be priced at the level set by that competition.
Saudi Arabia is not a direct supplier in Europe’s gas balance; its effect runs through oil. According to Bloomberg, Aramco told at least two European refiners that they would receive no October allocations under term contracts, with all European buyers affected (Bloomberg, 2026). Europe enters winter with simultaneous tightness in gas and oil. The seven OPEC+ countries meet on 4 October to set November output (ANI, 2026); the effect on volumes reaching Europe will depend on Saudi physical export capacity.
At the global level, as long as Hormuz transit remains restricted, Europe–Asia competition for cargoes is likely to remain the price-setting mechanism in 2027.
8. Assessment
Europe maintained physical continuity of gas supply through the 2026 Gulf shock, and the Commission’s assessment is correct on that criterion. The storage gap did not close, Germany is on course to miss its target according to Carbon Pulse, and the Commission relaxed the 80% target. Supply continued because TTF rose to its highest since late 2022 and Asian buyers reduced imports. The resilience of the post-2022 arrangement is purchased in the global LNG market, so Europe’s supply security is assured in volume and remains contingent on price competition with Asia. Three milestones will test this assessment:
1. The extended Gas Coordination Group meeting on 8 October 2026, where preliminary winter-preparedness findings are due (Magenta, 2026). An official fill figure below Axpo’s 70–73% range would widen the winter gap.
2. The ECB meeting on 29 October 2026. Gas prices above the €51.0/MWh assumption for 2026 would raise the likelihood of upward revisions to the euro-area energy projections.
3. Asian LNG import data for the fourth quarter. A further fall in Japanese, Chinese and South Korean imports would confirm that Europe’s volume continues to come from Asian demand reduction; a recovery would indicate that Asian buyers are outbidding Europe.
SOURCES
ANI. (2026, 7 September). OPEC+ keeps October oil output quota unchanged from September levels. Gulf News. https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/opec-keeps-october-oil-output-quota-unchanged-from-september-levels-1.500665366
ANSA. (2026, 20 August). EU: No immediate risk to gas supplies, stockpiles at 62%. https://www.ansa.it/amp/europa/en/news/2026/08/20/eu-no-immediate-risk-to-gas-supplies-stockpiles-at-62_1c471a32-7f79-44e3-8797-8c8fb061711c.html
Bloomberg. (2026, 22 September). Saudis tell Asian refiners they can soon pick up oil from Yanbu. The Edge Malaysia. https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/818893
Cherp, A., & Jewell, J. (2014). The concept of energy security: Beyond the four As. Energy Policy, 75, 415–421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.09.005
Chiappini, R., Jégourel, Y., & Raymond, P. (2019). Towards a worldwide integrated market? New evidence on the dynamics of U.S., European and Asian natural gas prices. Energy Economics, 81, 545–565. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2019.04.020
European Central Bank. (2026, 10 September). ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, September 2026. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/projections/html/ecb.projections202609_ecbstaff~8e340fc69d.en.html
European Commission. (2026, 23 March). Commission calls on EU countries to start preparing for winter amid Middle East energy disruption. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-calls-eu-countries-start-preparing-winter-amid-middle-east-energy-disruption-2026-03-23_en
Johnston, F. (2026, 10 September). ANALYSIS: Germany on course to miss gas storage targets as EU supply tightens ahead of winter. Carbon Pulse. https://carbon-pulse.com/549043/
Magenta, A. (2026, 25 September). Gas, EU says storage below average but supplies stable: Situation under close watch. Eunews. https://www.eunews.it/en/2026/09/25/gas-eu-says-storage-below-average-but-supplies-stable-situation-under-close-watch/
OilPriceAPI. (2026, 12 September). European gas prices: The climb into September, charted. https://www.oilpriceapi.com/blog/european-gas-ttf-september-2026
Paraskova, T. (2026, 6 August). Europe’s gas storage hits lowest level since 2011 as winter looms. Oilprice.com. https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Europes-Gas-Storage-Hits-Lowest-Level-Since-2011-as-Winter-Looms.amp.html
Rudaw. (2026, 28 July). Türkiye-İran doğal gaz anlaşmasının süresi yarın doluyor [The Türkiye–Iran natural gas agreement expires tomorrow]. https://rudaw.net/turkish/categories/economic/1280876
Rystad Energy. (2026, 28 August). Short-term outlook: Europe draws in additional LNG volumes. https://www.rystadenergy.com/insights/short-term-outlook-europe-draws-in-additional-lng-volumes
Sommer, A. (2026, 8 September). Summer heat and conflict stoke winter risks. Axpo. https://www.axpo.com/es/en/newsroom/magazine/energy-market/summer-heat-and-conflict-stoke-winter-risks.html
Winzer, C. (2012). Conceptualizing energy security. Energy Policy, 46, 36–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.02.067
XTB. (2026, 20 August). European TTF gas surges to a five-month high as storage levels fall. https://www.xtb.com/en/market-analysis/european-ttf-gas-surges-to-a-five-month-high-as-storage-levels-fall
Furkan Mahmut Tameroglu