Ends, ways and means for Türkiye, with Saudi Arabia’s parallel problem, as Hormuz and the Red Sea both bind, September 2026 to 2027
ABSTRACT
Since July 2026 Gulf energy has reached world markets through two constrained passages: Hormuz, restricted since early March, and the Red Sea route Saudi Arabia used to bypass it. Reading the September 2026 positions of the United States, China, Russia, the EU and Gulf states through Colgan (2013), Gholz and Press (2010) and Cherp and Jewell (2014), this piece argues that access in 2027 will be negotiated bilaterally even if a US–Iran deal reopens Hormuz, because Iranian seizure provisions, Houthi territorial gains and seller allocation choices would survive such a deal. Türkiye’s advantage lies in transit contracts and open channels, not naval power. Four steps follow; the principal risk is losing one channel through obligations to another party.
1. The strategic problem
By September 2026 the war that began on 28 February had tied Gulf energy’s access to world markets to two passages: Hormuz, restricted since early March, and, from July, the Red Sea route Saudi Arabia used to bypass it, where weekly Bab el-Mandeb transits fell from 319 to an average of 273 over 27 July–23 August (Lloyd’s List Intelligence, 2026). This piece derives a grand strategy for Türkiye for the order this system will produce in 2027. Its claim is that the order will not return to the pre-war arrangement in which multilateral rules were treated as securing transit; access will be set by a US–Iran bargain, a separate Red Sea front and bilateral allocation decisions between sellers and buyers. The scope is September 2026, the October calendar and 2027; bypass capacity and the Mecca defence framework, examined in other pieces on this site, enter only as means.
2. Where advantage sits
Colgan (2013) lists among the pathways from oil to war conflict over transit routes and the obstruction of multilateral cooperation; 2026 contains both, in fighting over the two straits and a blocked UN Security Council. Gholz and Press (2010) argue that markets usually adjust to supply disruptions through spare capacity, stocks and rerouting. This piece derives from that a binary: a power either changes the transit regime or absorbs the cost. Cherp and Jewell (2014) define energy security as low vulnerability of vital energy systems, combining exposure to risk with resilience; these are the two axes of Türkiye’s strategy.
Washington holds the Hormuz calendar: Iran ties reopening to the lifting of the US naval blockade, the release of frozen assets and an end to the war on all fronts (Brussels Signal, 2026). On 22 September Trump called at the UN for Iran’s “complete economic isolation” and said he believed a deal would be made “right after the election” (Schuler, 2026).
China and Russia adjust without building an order. The fighting threatens two Chinese supply lines at once, Iranian crude through Hormuz and Saudi cargoes through the Red Sea, yet on 16 September Wang Yi only urged Iran and the United States to “stay rational” and return to the Islamabad Memorandum (Carroll, 2026). The two powers vetoed a draft on navigation in Hormuz on 7 April (UN News, 2026) and abstained on 14 July on Resolution 2826, which extended reporting on Houthi Red Sea attacks to 15 January 2027 (Arab News Pakistan, 2026a). In Gholz and Press’s terms, they absorbed the cost.
The EU demands rules and takes prices. On 22 September Kallas asked Tehran for toll-free passage through Hormuz after the war and “free and unimpeded” navigation through Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb (Brussels Signal, 2026); no naval force or bargaining asset backed the demand. Aramco told at least two European refiners there would be no October term allocations, affecting all European buyers, while assuring Asian refiners of Yanbu loadings soon (Bloomberg, 2026). On the Red Sea, a Bahri VLCC was hit off Yanbu on 24 August and Suez transits over 24–30 August were 36% below normal (Lloyd’s List Intelligence, 2026); in September Al Jazeera reported Houthi seizure of the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands and Mayyun (Al Jazeera, 2026a). Advantage therefore sits with those who decide access: Washington through the blockade, Tehran through its transit regime, the forces holding the Red Sea coast and islands, and sellers allocating scarce capacity, none of them a multilateral rule.
3. Why a deal would not restore the pre-war order
The alternative view holds that a US–Iran agreement would restore the pre-war arrangement. For Hormuz this holds conditionally; two facts limit it. The security committee of Iran’s parliament approved provisions allowing the seizure of 20% of the cargo of ships deemed in violation (Brussels Signal, 2026). Unless a deal removes them, transit will run under an Iranian-regulated regime, not the toll-free regime the EU demands. The Red Sea front appears in Iran’s “all fronts” condition, but the coast and islands the Houthis took do not change hands automatically under a US–Iran agreement. In Colgan’s (2013) terms, when transit conflict and blocked multilateral cooperation combine, access ceases to be a public good and becomes an object of bargaining. The result is negotiated access.
4. Türkiye’s position: ends, ways and means
The end is energy access at bearable cost, with the ability to bargain with each party that decides access. The ways are cutting exposure through routes outside the Gulf and raising resilience by keeping channels open. The one-year Kirkuk–Ceyhan agreement signed on 1 August allocates 750,000 b/d, against actual flow of about 170,000 b/d (Arab News Pakistan, 2026b). Türkiye was mediating the Iran–Oman talks on a Hormuz route in August (NPR, 2026). Fidan said in April that Türkiye would see no problem in joining mine clearance after an Iran–US deal and would reassess if the technical coalition were drawn into new fighting (Reuters, 2026). Semafor reports that Türkiye has not committed troops under the Mecca defence framework reported by Al Jazeera (Gonzalez, 2026), whose text has not been officially published.
Saudi Arabia’s parallel problem is distributing exposure between two chokepoints. Shifting exports to the Red Sea created a new exposure; France’s dispatch of troops, radar and air-defence systems to the Yanbu oil terminal on 25 September shows Riyadh managing that risk with partners other than the United States (Al Jazeera, 2026b).
5. Step one: prepare for both post-election branches
After the 3 November midterms, a deal would reopen Hormuz gradually, with tolls and seizure depending on its content; without one, “complete economic isolation” continues and the two-chokepoint structure carries into 2027. In the first branch Türkiye’s interest coincides with the EU’s demand for toll-free passage, and Ankara can support that demand at low cost because it requires no naval means. In the second, the value of routes outside the Gulf rises. The indicator is whether a post-election text repeals the 20% seizure provisions.
6. Step two: reduce exposure outside both chokepoints
Kirkuk–Ceyhan is the only route in the sources reviewed that avoids both passages. Flow in early August was about 23% of the allocation (170 ÷ 750 = 0.227). The agreement expires in summer 2027, the date on which this option will be tested. In negotiated access a bilateral transit contract holds value, and the value rises while both chokepoints stay constrained. The indicator is monthly flow against allocation and the tenure obtained at renewal.
7. Step three: convert mediation into a seat in technical arrangements
With no alternative from China and Russia and no enforcement means in the EU, the open space is technical: route coordinates, mine clearance and transit terms. Türkiye’s role in the Iran–Oman talks and its conditional demining offer are means the major powers are not using. A seat in a post-deal demining or routing mechanism would give Ankara information and standing in implementing whatever regime emerges. Fidan’s caveat sets the limit. The indicator is the inclusion of Turkish personnel or assets in any post-deal technical mechanism.
8. Step four: use the Saudi relationship for supply, not force
Aramco’s October decisions show that seller preference decides who receives scarce Red Sea barrels (Bloomberg, 2026). Türkiye’s ties with Riyadh are better spent on supply allocation than on military obligations Ankara has not taken on. The sources reviewed do not give the Saudi share of Türkiye’s crude imports, so the weight of this step depends on Turkish refiners’ Gulf exposure. The indicator is whether European and Mediterranean buyers regain Aramco term allocations in November.
9. The principal risk
Step three rests on the channel to Iran; step four rests on the Saudi relationship. Accepting military obligations under the Mecca framework would force a choice between them and cost one means. A second risk is a deal that opens Hormuz but leaves the Red Sea unresolved, lowering the value of step two and raising the cost of standing outside Aramco’s preferred buyers.
10. Outlook: Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the World
October’s indicators are daily Hormuz transits, Aramco’s November allocations to European buyers and Tehran’s response to Kallas; the decisive date is 3 November. For Türkiye, a deal makes the demining offer and toll-free advocacy the relevant instruments; no deal makes the summer 2027 Kirkuk–Ceyhan renewal the central test, measured by flow. For Saudi Arabia, if Hormuz reopens in 2027 the choice will be between keeping the Yanbu route as a reserve, at the cost of defending it, and reconcentrating exports at Gulf ports, at the cost of renewed Hormuz exposure. Globally, no multilateral transit arrangement was on the agenda in September. The expiry of Resolution 2826 on 15 January 2027 (Arab News Pakistan, 2026a) will be the first test of whether the Council can move beyond reporting in the Red Sea. If the division shown by the 7 April veto persists, access will continue to be set by bilateral bargaining.
11. Conclusion
Iran’s seizure provisions, Houthi territorial gains and seller allocation choices mean that a deal would reopen Hormuz without restoring the pre-war order. For Türkiye the strategy that follows is to prepare for both post-election branches, convert the Kirkuk–Ceyhan allocation into flow, turn mediation into a role in technical arrangements and use the Saudi relationship for supply rather than force. Its success depends on keeping the channels to Tehran and Riyadh open at the same time.
SOURCES
Al Jazeera. (2026a, 15 September). Saudi Arabia promises to respond to Houthi attacks ‘firmly’. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/15/houthis-report-air-strikes-in-yemen-after-saudi-arabia-vows-firm-response
Al Jazeera. (2026b, 25 September). Saudi Arabia allies line up support as Houthi attacks mount. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/25/saudi-arabia-allies-line-up-support-as-houthi-attacks-mount
Arab News Pakistan. (2026a, 14 July). UN Security Council renews monitoring of Houthi Red Sea attacks amid Yemen airspace escalation. https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2650898
Arab News Pakistan. (2026b, 1 August). Turkiye, Iraq sign one-year oil pipeline deal. https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2653014/middle-east
Bloomberg. (2026, 22 September). Saudis tell Asian refiners they can soon pick up oil from Yanbu. The Edge Malaysia. https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/818893
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NPR. (2026, 6 August). Iran says it is close to reaching agreement with Oman to reopen Strait of Hormuz. VPM. https://www.vpm.org/npr-news/npr-news/2026-08-06/iran-says-it-is-close-to-reaching-agreement-with-oman-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz
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Furkan Mahmut Tameroglu