The 10–11 September outage, the Yanbu terminal ceiling, the restart timeline and the limits of bypassing Hormuz
ABSTRACT
This brief compiles what is verifiable about Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline and the Yanbu terminal between March and September 2026, separating nameplate capacity, effective capacity and actual flow, and separating confirmed figures from estimates and disputed attributions. The compilation shows that the binding link in the export chain is the Yanbu terminal at about 4–4.5 mb/d, not the 7 mb/d pipeline; that damage to three stations in a drone attack launched from Iraqi territory on 10–11 September shut the whole line for 11 days; and that the Red Sea route has carried rising Houthi and insurance risk since July. Bypassing Hormuz concentrated transit risk on one line, a few pumping stations and one terminal.
1. Concepts and scope
Cherp and Jewell (2014) define energy security as the low vulnerability of vital energy systems, with vulnerability set jointly by exposure to risks and the capacity to withstand them. Winzer (2012) proposes classifying supply-continuity risks by source (technical failure, deliberate attack, natural event) and by the magnitude, duration and speed of their effect. Read together, the two frameworks require testing whether the bypass reduced exposure at Hormuz while creating a new exposure elsewhere. In this brief, “single-point dependence” means that the failure of one component stops the whole supply chain; in a series pipeline, chain capacity equals that of its weakest link. “Nameplate capacity” is the design value, “actual flow” the volume carried on a given date, and “effective capacity” the usable volume after terminal, storage and security constraints. The scope is March–September 2026 and the actors are Aramco, the Saudi government, the Houthis and the Iraqi-launched drone attack. Price paths and comparisons with other regional bypass lines are excluded.
2. The capacity chain: the terminal binds
| Link | Figure (mb/d) | Type | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| East–West pipeline | 7 | Nameplate | Argus Media (2026) |
| Of which to Red Sea refineries | about 2 | Allocation | Argus Media (2026) |
| Left for export | about 5 | Derived by source | Argus Media (2026) |
| Yanbu loading (North 1.5, South 3) | 4.5 | Nameplate | Argus Media (2026) |
| Yanbu loading | about 4 | Effective, market sources | Argus Media (2026) |
| Terminal constraint | 4.5–5 | Estimate | Kpler (2026) |
| Flow routed to Yanbu before the attack | about 4 | Actual | Yap et al. (2026) |
The difference between what the pipeline can release for export and what the terminal can load identifies the terminal as the binding link. Pre-war use hid this ceiling: Yanbu exported an average of 760 kb/d in 2025, and its highest combined single-period loading was 1.7 mb/d in August 2024 (Argus Media, 2026). Signal Ocean data show average loadings above 4 mb/d from June 2026, reaching 4.7 mb/d around 13 July, with the terminal operating close to maximum (Hellenic Shipping News, 2026). Against about 973 kb/d in the same period of 2025, average use rose more than fourfold (4.0 ÷ 0.973 ≈ 4.1, taking the 4 mb/d average floor; author’s calculation). The bypass had become the main export channel, and with no slack left any failure in the chain became a direct export loss.
Production data are consistent with the ceiling. The IEA reports Saudi output falling from 8.24 mb/d in July to 5.97 mb/d in August (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2026). Because the August fall preceded the pipeline outage, the terminal ceiling under the Hormuz restriction may also have capped production; this is an inference from reading the two data sets together, not a finding stated by the IEA.
3. The September outage: verified, estimated and disputed
Two separate attack waves hit Saudi energy infrastructure in September. On 8 September Houthi missiles and drones struck Jizan, Najran and Abha, wounding 73, and the Energy Ministry said some operations were temporarily halted (Abdallah & Choukeir, 2026). The pipeline attack came on 10–11 September; the date varies by source. A US official said the drones originated in Iraq (Kool, 2026), Saudi Arabia blamed Iraqi militias (Yap et al., 2026), and according to Alhurra Iran denied responsibility (Alhurra, 2026). The perpetrator is disputed, and the attack cannot be attributed to the Houthis.
Reported by Reuters: three of the line’s stations (it has 11 pumping and 2 pressure-relief stations) were damaged, and the entire line was shut for 11 days (Yap et al., 2026). The Maritime Executive reported that 8 of 11 stations were running at restart, with temporary shunt lines laid around the damaged ones (The Maritime Executive, 2026). The line reopened at a low rate on 22 September. Estimates, not outcomes: a return to 40 per cent of capacity within days and to full capacity in 6–8 weeks (Yap et al., 2026). The disproportion between the share of stations damaged and the share of the chain stopped is the empirical signature of single-point dependence.
The vulnerability predates 2026. On 14 May 2019 drones hit two pumping stations at Dawadmi and Afif, and Aramco halted pumping as a precaution (Ajel, 2019). No parallel line was built in the seven years between the two attacks. Kpler puts a proposed 1–2 mb/d expansion at 2028 at the earliest (Kpler, 2026).
Aramco’s flexibility mitigated the outage without changing the chain’s structure. Data cited by roic.ai show Gulf loadings averaging 3.7 mb/d from 12 September and seven VLCCs carrying about 14 million barrels loaded on 20 September (Harcourt, 2026). The same source carries a Kpler estimate that a one-month closure with Yanbu stocks exhausted could have cost about 120 million barrels (Harcourt, 2026). Sources conflict on when Yanbu loadings resumed: roic.ai reported no tanker loadings as of 24 September, while Industrial Info reported a loading from Yanbu the same day (Harcourt, 2026; Industrial Info Resources, 2026). The SAMREF refinery at Yanbu (400 kb/d) cut runs by 50 per cent and is expected to operate at reduced rates at least through October (Industrial Info Resources, 2026).
4. Risk transferred to the Red Sea
The bypass moved exports into Houthi range. The Houthis declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia in July 2026 (Abdallah & Choukeir, 2026), and daily vessel traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb fell from about 80 to about 30 (Industrial Info Resources, 2026). According to Ship Universe, the war-risk premium for Yanbu rose from below 1 per cent in early July to about 3 per cent, reached 7 per cent at southern ports including Jizan and 6–9 per cent for Hormuz voyages, and Saudi Arabia set up a national marine war-risk pool run by Saudi Re (Ship Universe Editorial Team, 2026). The Yanbu premium stays below Hormuz, but the market does not price the Red Sea as a riskless alternative, and the state pool moves part of the unpriced risk onto the public balance sheet.
5. Risk register
1. Repeat strike before full repair. With temporary shunt lines in place until the 6–8 week repair ends, damage to further stations would again stop the whole line.
2. Terminal ceiling. At about 4 mb/d effective capacity, Yanbu cannot absorb more export volume even with the pipeline whole.
3. Red Sea maritime exposure. The Houthi blockade, lower Bab el-Mandeb traffic and higher premiums raise the cost of every Yanbu cargo.
4. Contested attribution. An Iraqi-launched attack, with Iran denying involvement, complicates deterrence and air-defence orientation, which must now cover approaches from Iraq as well as from Yemen.
5. Downstream knock-on. SAMREF’s 50 per cent cut shows that pipeline outages hit Red Sea refining as well as crude exports.
6. Outlook: Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the World
For Saudi Arabia, the repair calendar decides October. A 6–8 week full repair counted from 22 September (Yap et al., 2026) implies full capacity between 3 and 17 November; the dates are derived from the source estimate. The seven OPEC+ countries meet on 4 October to set November output, but with Saudi Arabia’s required October level at 10.478 mb/d (ANI, 2026) against actual August output of 5.97 mb/d (IEA, 2026), a gap of about 4.5 mb/d (author’s calculation), the quota decision is likely to remain secondary to physical export capacity. For 2027 the conditional branches are clear: if Hormuz reopens in stages, the line returns to a reserve role and the post-2028 expansion becomes a redundancy investment; if the strait stays restricted, Saudi exports remain tied to the Red Sea threat level.
For Türkiye, the Saudi case argues for assessing transit infrastructure by usable rather than design capacity; Kirkuk–Ceyhan’s dependence on security and political conditions is the Turkish counterpart. Continued Red Sea risk can raise freight and insurance costs on Gulf crude and product cargoes routed via Suez to Türkiye.
At the global level, the IEA’s September report puts effective spare capacity at 0.22 mb/d (IEA, 2026). A new East–West outage could not be offset by another producer’s extra supply, so the security of individual pumping stations now matters to the market as much as the Hormuz transit regime.
7. Assessment
The verified record supports three statements: Yanbu, not the pipeline, sets the export ceiling; three damaged stations stopped the whole line for 11 days; and Red Sea risk has been priced upward since July. Gulf loadings in September show that the system is not wholly dependent on one channel, but both channels are restricted. Three milestones will show whether the bypass recovers:
1. Restart ramp. Confirmation of 40 per cent throughput in late September and of full capacity between 3 and 17 November.
2. Yanbu loadings. Resolution of the conflicting 24 September reports and a return of loadings towards the pre-attack 4 mb/d.
3. OPEC+ on 4 October. Whether the November quota is set with reference to physical export capacity or remains decoupled from it.
SOURCES
Abdallah, N., & Choukeir, J. (2026, 8 September). Houthi attacks disrupt Saudi energy facilities, wound 73, authorities say. Al-Monitor. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/houthi-attacks-disrupt-saudi-energy-facilities-wound-73-authorities-say
Ajel. (2019, 14 May). Air strike on Aramco’s two oil pumping stations. https://english.ajel.sa/lifestyle/air-strike-on-aramcos-two-oil-pumping-stations
Alhurra. (2026, 29 September). Exclusive: Iran denies involvement in attack on Saudi oil pipeline. https://alhurra.com/en/43451
ANI. (2026, 7 September). OPEC+ keeps October oil output quota unchanged from September levels. Gulf News. https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/opec-keeps-october-oil-output-quota-unchanged-from-september-levels-1.500665366
Argus Media. (2026, 10 March). Yanbu gives Aramco limited option for rerouting crude. https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2798868-yanbu-gives-aramco-limited-option-for-rerouting-crude
Cherp, A., & Jewell, J. (2014). The concept of energy security: Beyond the four As. Energy Policy, 75, 415–421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.09.005
Harcourt, A. (2026, 24 September). Saudi East-West pipeline restarts at low rate but Yanbu tanker loadings yet to resume. roic.ai. https://www.roic.ai/news/saudi-east-west-pipeline-restarts-at-low-rate-but-yanbu-tanker-loadings-yet-to-resume-09-24-2026
Hellenic Shipping News. (2026, 16 July). Yanbu crude exports near capacity as Gulf shipping risks mount. https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/?p=1140918
Industrial Info Resources. (2026, 24 September). Saudi oil loaded from port at Yanbu after pipeline attack. https://www.industrialinfo.com/iirenergy/industry-news/article/saudi-oil-loaded-from-port-at-yanbu-after-pipeline-attack–362883
International Energy Agency. (2026). Oil market report – September 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-september-2026
Kool, T. (2026, 11 September). Drone strikes hit Saudi Arabia’s vital East-West oil pipeline. OilPrice.com. https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Drone-Strikes-Hit-Saudi-Arabias-Vital-East-West-Oil-Pipeline.amp.html
Kpler. (2026, 21 July). New pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz could come online in 1-2 years. Hellenic Shipping News. https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/?p=1141612
Ship Universe Editorial Team. (2026, 25 September). Saudi Red Sea tanker insurance costs surge as Yanbu war-risk premium hits 3%. Ship Universe. https://www.shipuniverse.com/?p=20543
The Maritime Executive. (2026, 22 September). Report: Saudi Aramco achieves partial restart on strategic Red Sea pipeline. https://maritime-executive.com/article/report-saudi-aramco-achieves-partial-restart-on-strategic-red-sea-pipeline
Winzer, C. (2012). Conceptualizing energy security. Energy Policy, 46, 36–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.02.067
Yap, T., Verma, N., & Tan, F. (2026, 22 September). Saudi Arabia restarts East-West oil pipeline, sources say. Al-Monitor. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/saudi-arabia-restarts-east-west-oil-pipeline-sources-say
Furkan Mahmut Tameroglu