Nominal versus usable capacity on four Hormuz bypass routes, and the role Türkiye can claim
ABSTRACT
Restricted transit through Hormuz since March 2026 has tied Gulf crude exports to four overland bypass routes: ADCOP to Fujairah, East–West to Yanbu, Kirkuk–Ceyhan and the planned Basra–Haditha line. Comparing nominal capacity, observed flow and binding constraint from dated industry data, classified with Winzer’s (2012) sources of risk, this piece argues that the gap between nominal and usable capacity is mainly political and institutional. ADCOP ran above nameplate under single-state control; Kirkuk–Ceyhan ran below one-eighth of design capacity. For Türkiye, holder of the most idle capacity, the task is to make it usable. Four steps follow, with the principal risk of investing ahead of a routing decision Iraq has not made.
1. The strategic problem
Before the war about 15 mb/d of crude passed through Hormuz (Al Arabiya English, 2026). Once transit was restricted from early March 2026, Gulf exports depended on how much the overland bypass routes could actually carry. The claim here is that usability was decided by control of the chain from field to terminal, by terminal and feeder investment, and by security, and that Türkiye’s route scores worst on the first two despite having the largest spare pipe. The piece covers March–September 2026 and the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Türkiye; Ceyhan’s prospects as a pricing hub are treated in the companion Ceyhan Strategy.
2. Where advantage sits
Nominal capacity here means a pipeline’s maximum daily throughput by design or operator statement. Usable capacity means what the same line can carry given its export terminal, connected fields, contracts and security conditions. Winzer (2012) separates risks to continuity of supply by source into technical, human and natural. Applied to bypass lines, it yields three constraint types: technical (terminal size), institutional (contracts, disputes) and deliberate attack. Cherp and Jewell (2014) define energy security as low vulnerability of vital energy systems; by that definition a bypass line reduces vulnerability to Hormuz while creating new vulnerabilities at its terminal, in its transit state and at its pumping stations.
| Route | Nominal capacity | Observed flow or limit, 2026 | Binding constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADCOP (Habshan–Fujairah) | ~1.5 mb/d | 1.7–1.8 mb/d (May) | Pipe size |
| East–West (Abqaiq–Yanbu) | 7 mb/d | Yanbu terminal ~4.5–5 mb/d | Export terminal |
| Kirkuk–Ceyhan | 1.5 mb/d | ~180 kb/d (June); ~170 kb/d (early August) | Field connection, contract |
| Basra–Haditha (plan) | 2.25 mb/d | Not built | Feasibility, finance |
Sources: The Maritime Executive (2026); Kpler (2026); Kozok et al. (2026); Arab News Pakistan (2026); Enerdata (2026).
3. What the four routes show
ADCOP, operating since 2012, ran at 1.7–1.8 mb/d in May 2026 against nameplate of about 1.5 mb/d, and the Crown Prince instructed ADNOC to accelerate a new line of similar capacity (The Maritime Executive, 2026). Kpler reports the $3 billion, 300-km parallel line was 50 per cent complete in July and will lift UAE bypass capacity from 1.8 mb/d to over 3 mb/d when it starts in mid-2027 (Kpler, 2026). Field, pipe and terminal sit under one state, and expansion was accelerated by one instruction; ADCOP’s limit is physical, not institutional.
The East–West line reached its full 7 mb/d on 28 March 2026, with 2 mb/d going to Saudi refineries and 5 mb/d to export via Yanbu (Al Arabiya English, 2026). Kpler puts the Yanbu terminal constraint at about 4.5–5 mb/d (Kpler, 2026); Argus gives nominal loading capacity of 4.5 mb/d (1.5 at Yanbu North, 3 at Yanbu South) and market estimates of effective capacity near 4 mb/d (Argus Media, 2026). Loadings reached 4.7 mb/d in mid-July, close to the maximum (Hellenic Shipping News, 2026). Yanbu’s 2025 average exports were 760,000 b/d (Argus Media, 2026), which shows it was run as a secondary outlet while Hormuz was open. The ceiling reflects an earlier investment decision, and the proposed 1–2 mb/d of extra line capacity is not expected before 2028 (Kpler, 2026).
The September outage exposed the third constraint. After drone attacks on 10–11 September (dates vary by source) the line restarted at low rates on 22 September, 11 days later, with about 40 per cent of capacity expected within days and full capacity in six to eight weeks; Riyadh attributed the attack to Iraqi militias (Yap et al., 2026), and Iran denied involvement (Alhurra, 2026). Whatever the attribution, a few pumping stations could temporarily take all Saudi bypass capacity offline.
Kirkuk–Ceyhan shows the widest gap. The 986-km line has design capacity of 1.5 mb/d; June flow was about 180,000 b/d, and the one-year agreement of 1 August reserves up to 750,000 b/d subject to security and infrastructure conditions (Kozok et al., 2026). Flow in early August was about 170,000 b/d (Arab News Pakistan, 2026). The allocation is more than four times the flow (750 ÷ 170 ≈ 4.4) and design capacity more than eight times (1,500 ÷ 170 ≈ 8.8). The cause is institutional. Iraqi output fell from 4.3 mb/d to about 1.2 mb/d by March (Enerdata, 2026), and the Basra–Haditha plan itself confirms that no pipeline links the Hormuz-dependent southern fields to the northern line. Türkiye had demanded full use of 1.5 mb/d, a five-to-ten-year commitment and a fee for unused capacity (Bloomberg HT, 2026); the one-year outcome gives no basis for long-term investment.
Scale limits all four routes. About 4 mb/d from East–West through Yanbu, 1.7–1.8 mb/d from ADCOP and about 170,000 b/d from Kirkuk–Ceyhan sum to roughly 5.9–6.0 mb/d, less than half of the pre-war 15 mb/d (author’s calculation from figures of different dates, so an order of magnitude only).
4. Türkiye’s position, ends, ways and means
Idle capacity is an advantage only when oil can reach it. The end is a Kirkuk–Ceyhan line that functions as a usable Gulf bypass rather than a reserve of unused steel. The ways are influence over Iraq’s routing decision, upstream participation and terminal and security planning. The means are BOTAŞ’s contract, TPAO’s 15 per cent stake in BP’s Kirkuk consortium, acquired during the talks (Kozok et al., 2026), and the Ministry of Energy’s negotiating position.
5. Step one: secure the missing link
Iraq authorised a tender for the 2.25 mb/d, $4.6 billion Basra–Haditha line on 10 April 2026 (Enerdata, 2026). Kpler lists two onward routes, to Kirkuk–Ceyhan or to Banyas on the Syrian coast; feasibility may be completed by end-2026, and construction could start in 2027 and take three to five years (Kpler, 2026). Kirkuk–Ceyhan’s idle capacity can therefore matter only around 2030, and only if Iraq chooses the northern route. The first step is to make the northern option more attractive to Baghdad before feasibility closes. The indicator is the route named in the feasibility outcome.
6. Step two: shorten the chain of control
ADCOP’s performance shows that usable capacity rises when field, pipe and terminal answer to one decision-maker. Kirkuk–Ceyhan crosses a state border, depends on Iraqi upstream decisions and runs under a one-year contract. TPAO’s consortium stake is a first link between Turkish interest and northern production; a rise in Kirkuk output raises line flow and TPAO’s share of output together. More upstream positions mean fewer separate decisions on which flow depends. The indicator is flow against the 750,000 b/d allocation.
7. Step three: size the terminal for the bypass case
Yanbu was built for a world in which Hormuz stayed open, and its loading ceiling cut the East–West line’s value in the crisis. The sources reviewed give no figure for Ceyhan’s loading or storage capacity. Terminal planning should follow the bypass case, not current flows, so that a future routing decision is not capped at the coast. The indicator is published loading capacity at Ceyhan relative to planned pipeline capacity.
8. Step four: build security into the offer
The East–West outage showed that a bypass moves risk to pumping stations and terminals. The Kirkuk–Ceyhan allocation is itself conditional on security (Kozok et al., 2026). An offer to Baghdad and to Gulf producers that includes redundancy at pumping stations and agreed outage procedures addresses the constraint that Riyadh discovered in September. The indicator is outage days per year on the line.
9. The principal risk
Steps three and four require spending before Iraq has chosen a route and before the Hormuz regime is known. If Iraq selects Banyas, or if the strait normalises and southern exports return to the Gulf, investment in terminal size and security at the Turkish end would serve flows that never arrive. The mitigation is sequencing: commit large terminal and security spending after the end-2026 feasibility outcome, and keep earlier steps to low-cost contract and upstream positions.
10. Outlook: Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the World
For Türkiye, the one-year agreement opens a new negotiation in summer 2027. A Kirkuk–Ceyhan routing outcome from the Basra–Haditha feasibility work at end-2026 would give the five-to-ten-year demand a concrete volume behind it; a Banyas outcome would make the spare capacity structural. Either way, 2027 flow stays bounded by northern Iraqi output.
For Saudi Arabia, the near-term test is the East–West line’s return to full capacity. Reuters’ six-to-eight-week estimate (Yap et al., 2026), counted from 22 September, places it in November, and the IEA’s Oil Market Report of 14 October (International Energy Agency, 2026) will give the first institutional data on the outage’s effect on Saudi exports. No project in the sources raises Yanbu terminal capacity for 2027, so Saudi bypass exports should remain capped by the terminal through 2027 even after full repair.
Globally, the UAE’s parallel line in mid-2027 is the nearest addition to bypass capacity. If Hormuz stays restricted, Red Sea and Gulf of Oman terminals become the market’s next constraint; if it reopens, the fate of crisis-era projects will show whether redundancy is permanent.
11. Conclusion
Bypass capacity cannot be measured in installed steel. ADCOP exceeded nameplate under integrated ownership; East–West was capped by a terminal sized for an open Hormuz and lost 11 days to attack; Kirkuk–Ceyhan ran below one-eighth of design capacity because no southern oil reaches it and its contract lasts one year. Chain integration and feeder or terminal investment, two of the three conditions deciding usability, are political and institutional. Türkiye’s role in the bypass system therefore depends less on its pipe than on Iraq’s routing decision, upstream participation and a security offer, sequenced so that large spending follows the end-2026 feasibility result.
SOURCES
Al Arabiya English. (2026, 28 March). Saudi pipeline that bypasses Strait of Hormuz hits 7-million-barrel goal. https://english.alarabiya.net/amp/business/energy/2026/03/28/saudi-pipeline-that-bypasses-strait-of-hormuz-hits-7millionbarrel-goal
Alhurra. (2026, 29 September). Exclusive: Iran denies involvement in attack on Saudi oil pipeline. https://alhurra.com/en/43451
Arab News Pakistan. (2026, 1 August). Turkiye, Iraq sign one-year oil pipeline deal. Arab News. https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2653014/middle-east
Argus Media. (2026, 10 March). Yanbu gives Aramco limited option for rerouting crude. https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2798868-yanbu-gives-aramco-limited-option-for-rerouting-crude
Bloomberg HT. (2026, 16 June). Türkiye Kerkük-Ceyhan’ı şartlar değişmeden yenilemek istemiyor [Türkiye does not want to renew Kirkuk–Ceyhan on unchanged terms]. https://www.bloomberght.com/turkiye-kerkuk-ceyhani-sartlar-degismeden-yenilemek-istemiyor-3780205
Cherp, A., & Jewell, J. (2014). The concept of energy security: Beyond the four As. Energy Policy, 75, 415–421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.09.005
Enerdata. (2026, 10 April). Iraq plans 2.25 mb/d export route bypassing Strait of Hormuz. https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/iraq-plans-225-mbd-export-route-bypassing-strait-hormuz.html
Hellenic Shipping News. (2026, 16 July). Yanbu crude exports near capacity as Gulf shipping risks mount. https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/?p=1140918
International Energy Agency. (2026). Oil market report – October 2026 [Event page]. https://www.iea.org/events/oil-market-report-october-2026
Kozok, F., Sykes, P., & Al-Ansary, K. (2026, 1 August). Turkey said to extend Iraq oil pipeline deal by one year. gCaptain. https://gcaptain.com/turkey-said-to-extend-iraq-oil-pipeline-deal-by-one-year/
Kpler. (2026, 21 July). New pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz could come online in 1-2 years. Hellenic Shipping News. https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/?p=1141612
The Maritime Executive. (2026, 15 May). UAE instructs ADNOC to accelerate pipeline construction to bypass Hormuz. https://maritime-executive.com/article/uae-instructs-adnoc-to-accelerate-pipeline-construction-to-bypass-hormuz
Winzer, C. (2012). Conceptualizing energy security. Energy Policy, 46, 36–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.02.067
Yap, T., Verma, N., & Tan, F. (2026, 22 September). Saudi Arabia restarts East-West oil pipeline, sources say. Al-Monitor. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/saudi-arabia-restarts-east-west-oil-pipeline-sources-say
Furkan Mahmut Tameroglu