Autonomy and attribution ambiguity in Iran’s relations with the Houthis and Iraqi armed groups, July–September 2026
ABSTRACT
This article examines how far Iran controlled the Houthis in August–September 2026 and how attribution ambiguity distributed responsibility for attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure. On 25 September President Pezeshkian said the Houthis were responsible for their own actions, while Iran’s seven-day Hormuz plan offered a halt on the Yemen front as a bargaining item. Using Mumford’s definition of proxy war and Juneau’s limited-control thesis, these statements are compared with agency reporting, Security Council texts and attribution claims on the 10–11 September East–West pipeline attack. Iran claims tradeable leverage over the Houthis, not command. Unresolved attribution of the Iraqi-launched strike kept Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States below the threshold of direct war and left Saudi infrastructure exposed.
1. Disowning a front while offering to close it
On 8 September 2026 the Houthis attacked civilian and energy targets in Jazan, Najran, Abha and Khamis Mushait, wounding at least 73 civilians (Al Jazeera, 2026a). On 10–11 September the East–West pipeline was struck in the Riyadh and Medina regions by drones launched from Iraqi territory (Al Jazeera, 2026b). The article argues that the Iran–Houthi relationship did not operate as a chain of command in 2026: Iran offered the Houthi front as an item of exchange in negotiations with the United States, while the Houthis timed their entry into the war according to local events. A second claim is that attribution of the Iraqi-launched attack remained unresolved because ambiguity forced none of the parties into direct conflict with Iran. The period is July–September 2026; because public sources do not reveal command links, the analysis addresses statements and conduct reported by agencies, Iranian state media and the Security Council, not internal decision-making.
2. Proxy, partner and attribution
Mumford (2013) defines proxy war as the indirect engagement of a third party seeking to influence the strategic outcome of a conflict. The criterion is the sponsor’s purpose; how far the recipient obeys lies outside the definition. Juneau (2016) works in that gap: Iran obtained a limited return on a modest investment in Yemen, with local dynamics driving Houthi decisions. Here a proxy enters and leaves war on its patron’s instruction; a partner receives weapons, transport or diplomatic support but decides on war and peace by its own calculation. Attribution ambiguity is the condition in which neither the operational perpetrator nor the political principal of an attack can be established by public evidence. Lupovici (2010) notes that the fourth wave of deterrence theory turns to non-state and asymmetric threats. Against such threats, the credibility of punishment depends on knowing whom to punish.
3. Two statements, one strategy
In late September Iran’s language on the Houthis moved in two directions. According to Iranian state media, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi passed three conditions for reopening the strait to US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff on 22–23 September: lifting of the naval blockade, release of frozen assets and an end to the war on all “resistance” fronts (The Standard, 2026). The seven-day plan that followed listed a halt to regional conflicts including Lebanon and Yemen, release of about $12 billion in assets, lifting of oil sanctions and the reopening of Hormuz on the seventh day (AFP, 2026). The proposal went through Qatari mediators, and the Wall Street Journal reported that Trump rejected it (Holland & Hafezi, 2026). In the same days Pezeshkian said the Houthis were responsible for their own actions (Reuters, 2026a).
Promising to halt a front while disowning it ceases to be contradictory once the statements are read as addressing different kinds of responsibility. Pezeshkian denies backward-looking military responsibility: if attacks on Saudi Arabia were attributed to Iran, Saudi and US retaliation could be directed at Tehran. The plan asserts forward-looking influence, offering restraint of the Houthis as something Washington can buy. This fits Juneau’s (2016) limited-control thesis with one amendment: in 2026 Iran sought its return in the Hormuz negotiation, not on the Yemeni battlefield. Full command would make the denial implausible; zero influence would strip the Yemen condition of bargaining value. Tehran can combine the two statements only because its influence is partial and unmeasurable from outside.
Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir discussed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia with Araghchi on 10 September (Reuters, 2026b), treating Tehran as the interlocutor. According to Al Jazeera’s 17 September report, US officials met Houthi representatives directly in Oman the previous weekend (Al Jazeera, 2026c). A separate channel implies a US judgement that the Iranian one could not determine Houthi conduct. The Security Council’s 25 September statement called for strict implementation of Resolution 2216 and for preventing the flow of weapons, finance and technical support to the Houthis (Qatar News Agency, 2026). It named external support without naming its provider.
4. Local triggers and an external link
The Houthis justified the 8 September attack locally, as a response to more than 120 Saudi strikes on Yemen in three days and to an air strike on al-Hazm prison in al-Jawf that they said killed 7 people (Al Jazeera, 2026a); these figures are unverified one-sided claims. On 3 July an Iranian aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation landed in Sanaa despite coalition warnings; on 13 July government forces fired on the runway to stop an unauthorised Iranian flight, and the Houthis launched missiles and drones at Abha Airport (Arab News Pakistan, 2026). The bond thus includes a physical transport line, but the event that started escalation was an intra-Yemeni dispute over whose permission governs the airport. Iran supplies resources and diplomatic cover; the timing of entry into war appears tied to a local struggle for control. The evidence supports the less demanding partner label, not the proxy label, which assumes instruction.
5. The Iraqi-launched strike: attribution as a shared equilibrium
Saudi Arabia said the drones were launched from Iraq, and the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office confirmed a launch point in Maysan province (Al Jazeera, 2026b); according to Reuters, Riyadh blamed Iraqi militias (Yap et al., 2026). Alhurra, citing Gulf and Iraqi officials, reported that Iran sent messages denying responsibility and hinting at Iraqi Shia groups, and that the United States mediated to delay Saudi retaliation (Alhurra, 2026). The line, with three pumping stations damaged, was shut for 11 days and restarted at reduced rates on 22 September (Yap et al., 2026). The sources do not attribute this attack to the Houthis, and treating it as part of the 8 September attack has no evidential support.
The attribution chain stops at three links: launch site (Iraqi territory), possible perpetrator (Iraqi militias) and possible principal (Iran). Public evidence supports the first, rests the second on Saudi statements, and raises the third only through Iran’s denial. While no political principal is established, Riyadh’s retaliation options remain confined to groups in Iraq and the threshold of direct war with Iran is not crossed. A July precedent marks the mechanism’s limit: joint Saudi–US strikes on 29 July killed more than 20 people at Popular Mobilisation Forces headquarters in Iraq (Shankar, 2026), yet direct retaliation against Iraqi groups did not prevent the September attack. In Lupovici’s (2010) terms, when the perpetrator–principal link cannot be proven, punishment does not reach the principal, and punishment of a substitutable perpetrator produces little deterrence.
US efforts to delay Saudi retaliation (Alhurra, 2026) show that ambiguity suited Washington while it negotiated over Hormuz. The equilibrium is jointly sustained by the group that conceals the perpetrator, the patron that denies responsibility, and the victim and its ally that avoid direct accountability.
6. Alternative explanations considered
A command reading treats Pezeshkian’s denial as cover for Iranian direction. The US–Houthi talks in Oman and the airport trigger weaken it; under command a separate channel would be unnecessary.
An opposite reading calls the Yemen condition empty. Munir’s approach to Araghchi and the Sanaa air link show Tehran holding some leverage. Partial, unmeasurable influence fits the evidence better than either.
7. What the case shows about proxy theory
The case supports Mumford’s (2013) decision to define proxy war by the sponsor’s purpose and shows its cost: the definition says nothing about control, and in 2026 control was the variable that mattered for retaliation. Ambiguity about control becomes a resource spent twice: denying responsibility and selling restraint.
8. Outlook: Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the World
According to Reuters sources, full restoration of the East–West line will take 6–8 weeks from 22 September (Yap et al., 2026); the launch point of any new attack in that window will show whether the attribution chain shortens. If the seven-day plan revives and the Yemen front visibly calms, Iran’s influence becomes observable and Pezeshkian’s denial loses credibility; if it stays rejected, the leverage stays unmeasurable and Tehran carries the ambiguity into 2027 negotiations.
For Saudi Arabia, blaming the Houthis and Iraqi groups avoids war with Iran but leaves infrastructure open to actors exploiting the perpetrator–principal gap. For Türkiye, attribution matters through two channels. Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani foreign ministers met under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement and agreed an emergency meeting of chiefs of general staff (Reuters, 2026a); attributing attacks to a state would raise expectations on Ankara beyond coordination. The second is Iraq: unresolved attribution lowers the cost for armed groups there of targeting energy infrastructure, a problem Türkiye’s energy links with Iraq share. Globally, while the Security Council condemns without naming external support (Qatar News Agency, 2026), patrons are unlikely to bear responsibility for attacks by non-state actors in 2027.
9. Conclusion
Pezeshkian’s denial and the Yemen condition in the seven-day plan are two parts of one strategy: avoiding past responsibility while putting future influence up for exchange. Houthi escalation followed local triggers, and the Iranian link shows in resources and transport, not in the decision to fight: the relationship is a partnership. In the Iraqi-launched pipeline attack, an attribution chain that stops at the launch site shielded Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States from direct conflict and left Saudi energy infrastructure open to low-cost attacks. The findings lack evidence on internal command links and rely on state media and agency accounts for Iranian statements.
SOURCES
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Furkan Mahmut Tameroglu